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DETERMINANTS OF OUTSIDE DIRECTOR TURNOVER 
 
Abstract: In this paper we provide evidence that independent director turnover is 
influenced by a series of economic factors. Directors, both independent and insider, are 
less likely to leave if they are paid well or if the firm has a director pension plan. They 
are also more likely to leave when the firm is performing poorly or when they expect it to 
perform poorly. They are more likely to leave when the firm is riskier, but are less likely 
to leave when they chair certain committees such as the audit and compensation 
committee, which may bring them more prestige, or perhaps an additional stipend.  
Differentially, the association between turnover and firm performance is weaker for 
inside directors. This is consistent with inside directors’ response to reputation concerns 
being lower than that of independent directors due to the bonding and compensation 
effects.
 
Keywords:  Director, Turnover, Economic Factors
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DETERMINANTS OF OUTSIDE DIRECTOR TURNOVER 
I. Introduction 
In contrast to the plethora of literature on executive, primarily, CEO, turnover, 
little has been written on independent director turnover.
1 Yet independent directors 
possess a large and increasing oversight role in the corporation. Consequently 
independent director turnover is an important topic to examine. Further the literature on 
CEO turnover cannot simply be applied to independent directors as independent directors 
have different incentives from CEOs.  For example, while CEOs receive the bulk of their 
remuneration and prestige from their position, independent directors, who often have full 
time positions, quite possibly as CEOs of their own corporations, and are likely to hold 
other directorships, only receive a small portion of their remuneration from one 
directorship. Consequently they may be more willing to leave voluntarily if they perceive 
a potential smudge to their reputation from the directorship.  This may arise from 
problems that exist or they anticipate will exist from the corporation. 
Our results derived from cross sectional analyses over the years 1998 2002 show 
that independent directors behave in a rational manner and act as if they are concerned 
with their reputations. That is, they are more likely to leave their positions when the 
company is having financial problems or they expect it to have problems. We find they 
are more likely to leave when accounting and stock returns are lower, and the firm is 
riskier, e.g., has a higher probability of bankruptcy, is the recipient of a non standard 
audit opinion. Perhaps most interesting, consistent with independent directors possessing 
                                                 
1 Consistent with the extant literature an independent director does not work for the firm, nor have other 
links that would compromise his or her independence.  The latter two are commonly known as inside and 
gray directors.   3
inside information, future accounting and stock returns are also lower in the year after 
director departure.  
When contrasted to inside director turnover, we find that independent directors 
are more sensitive to firm performance in deciding to leave their positions. The above 
finding holds after controlling for other factors that we believe may be associated with 
director departure, for example, director age and gender, and firm size. This finding is 
consistent with inside directors being less likely to quit than independent directors for a 
given level of firm performance. We attribute this effect to bonding with the firm. In 
other words, resignation from director’s position, almost always, implies resignation from 
the primary job as well. Since the inside director’s job with the firm is his/her primary 
source of livelihood, he/she is less likely to take drastic action. 
This paper continues with a brief review of the literature on turnover in section 2, 
which is followed by the development of our hypotheses in section 3. Section 4 discusses 
our model, while section 5 discusses the sample.  Section 6 discusses our empirical 
results.  We conclude with a summary of results. 
 
II. Previous literature 
Previous studies show that CEO turnover is associated with firm performance 
(Benston 1985; Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985; Warner et al. 1988; Weisbach, 1988; 
Puffer and Weintrop 1991), board composition (Weisbach 1988; Perry 1999), CEO stock 
ownership (Denis et al. 1997), compensation (Balsam and Miharjo 2007), and availability 
of replacements (Parrino 1997). In contrast we are only aware of a couple of papers that 
look at director turnover (Srinivasan 2005, Yermack 2004).   
Yermack (2004) examines turnover among outside directors of the Fortune 500 
between 1994 and 1996, showing that turnover is associated with director age, gender,   4
membership in the compensation committee, CEO turnover, and stock market returns. 
Srinivasan (2005) examines outside director turnover in 409 companies that restated their 
earnings from 1997 to 2001, finding that turnover is associated with being on the audit 
committee, performance, CEO turnover, director age, tenure, number of other 
directorships, and whether or not the director sold stock during the restatement period. 
We extend their research as follows.  First we look at a broader sample of 
companies over a longer time period, confirming the general results of Srinivasan (2005) 
and Yermack (2004). Second we examine a more complete set of variables, a set that not 
only incorporates the corporation’s past performance but also its future performance, 
finding results consistent with directors having inside information and using it in 
determining whether or not to continue on the board. Third we examine and find 
performance differentially affects the departure decisions of inside and independent 
directors. Finally, we also use a more refined measure of non routine director turnover, 
i.e., we exclude retirements that are mandated by firm policies regarding director age and 
tenure. 
III. Development of Hypotheses 
  Our focus in this paper is independent director turnover. It is our belief that 
because of their reputational incentives and diversification, independent directors will be 
more willing than corporate insiders to voluntarily relinquish their posts if they believe 
being associated with the firm will negatively impact their reputation. While this is 
consistent with the finding of increased outside director turnover for firms with earnings 
restatements found in Srinivasan (2005), our study extends his and that of Yermack 
(2004) in several ways. First, in contrast to Srinivasan (2005) who focuses on a non 
random sample of firms that restate their earnings and consequently we expect much of 
the turnover he observes to be involuntary, we examine director turnover across a broad   5
range of firms effectively examining both voluntary and involuntary turnover. Second, in 
addition to using historical variables, as in both Yermack (2004) and Srinivasan (2005), 
we also examine future measures of accounting and stock performance. Third, in addition 
to examining the determinants of independent director turnover, we also examine how 
performance differentially affects independent and inside director turnover. Finally, in 
contrast to Yermack (2004) and Srinivasan (2005), we also examine how the incentives 
provided by the compensation package affect the decision to remain with the firm. 
  Ultimately the director has a decision to make, continue on as a director in the 
firm or resign/decline to stand for reelection.  In doing so the director trades off the 
benefits provided by continuing on the board against the cost of doing so. The benefits 
include pecuniary benefits, such as, the remuneration, meeting fees, stock grants and 
pension, as well as non pecuniary benefits, such as, the prestige of being a corporate 
director. The costs incorporate the time commitment associated with serving on the 
board, as well as the potential costs to the director’s reputation from serving on this 
particular board.  In this paper, we can only examine the effects of some of these costs 
and benefits on director turnover due to data constraints.  For example, while we can 
measure director compensation with some degree of precision, we cannot measure the 
non pecuniary benefits the independent director gets from serving on the corporations 
board. 
  Our first hypothesis pertains to director’s compensation. Balsam and Miharjo 
(2007) show that executives are less likely to voluntarily leave their positions as the 
amount forfeited increases. We expect independent directors, like most people, to behave 
in a similar fashion.  That is, while they are concerned with their reputation and their 
time, they also respond to the monetary incentives provided by the firm and as such, the   6
greater their compensation the less likely they are to voluntarily resign, all else equal.  
Thus we predict: 
H1: Independent director turnover will be inversely related to director compensation. 
  Given that we expect directors to be concerned about their reputation, we feel that 
they are more likely to resign their posts when the firm is not doing well, i.e., they do not 
want to be associated with a losing firm. Alternatively, they may be more likely to be 
forced from the board by shareholders or step down in response to investor demands for 
change when the firm is doing poorly. Both lead to the same empirical prediction: 
H2: Independent director turnover is inversely related to prior firm performance. 
  Directors are officially classified as insiders by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, and as such, may have access to superior information about the firm’s 
future performance. If the director feels that the firm will do poorly in the future he or she 
is more likely to decide to leave the firm. Consequently, we expect that director turnover 
will be inversely related to future performance. 
H3: Independent director turnover is inversely related to future firm performance. 
  We also expect director turnover to be greater when firms have high risk, as the 
potential for negative outcomes is greater; and when those negative outcomes occur 
directors may be sued.  More so, not only may they be sued, but as in the Enron and 
WorldCom cases, the directors may wind up paying money out of their own pockets. For 
example Young (2005) reports that “Eleven former board members of WorldCom Inc. 
agreed to pay $20.2 million out of their own pockets”, while Smith and Weil (2005) 
report that “Ten former Enron Corp. directors agreed to dig into their own pockets to pay 
$13 million.”  Consequently our fourth hypothesis is: 
H4: Independent director turnover is positively associated with firm risk.   7
  Within the board, some directors, because of the committees they head, e.g., audit 
committee, will be more visible and potentially more culpable if something goes wrong.  
Our fifth hypothesis addresses the effect of committee chairing on turnover: 
H5: Independent director turnover is positively associated with chairing highly visible 
committees. 
  Similarly, if it can be documented that the director was lax in attending to his or 
her fiduciary responsibilities, for example they attend few meetings, they could be at risk. 
Consequently they may decide to step down, or the company may ask for them to step 
down or decline to nominate them for another term. Our last hypothesis addresses this 
issue: 
H6: Independent director turnover is positively associated with poor director attendance. 
IV. Model 
  To test the above hypotheses, in addition to portfolio tests, we also use the 
following model:  
Director Turnovert = α0 +  β1Director Remunerationt + β2Existence of Director Pension 
Plant + β3Market Returnt + β4Market Returnt+1 + β5Return on Assetst+ β6Return 
on Assetst+1 + β7Probability of Bankruptcyt + β8Litigation Prone Industryt  + 
β9High Positive Discretionary Accrualst + β10Meet or Beat Earnings Forecastst 
+ β11High Positive Discretionary Accrualst * Meet or Beat Earnings Forecastst + 
β12Qualified Audit Opiniont + β13Audit Committee Chairt + β14Compensation 
Committee Chairt + β15Poor Director Attendancet + β16Director Aget + 
β17Director Gendert +  β18New CEOt + β19Director holds a full time position 
outside the firmt + β20Number of Other Directorshipst + β21High Tech Industryt 
+ β22Big Five Auditort + β23Sizet + ε                  (1) 
   
When we run the above model, we only use independent directors.  However 
implicit in our theory and hypotheses, firm performance is more likely to influence the 
turnover decision for independent directors than for executives who would be giving up 
the bulk of their income were they to resign from the firm. To explicitly test this 
hypothesis, we modify model (1) to allow the coefficients on the performance variables   8
to differ between independent and inside directors. Analogous to the director’s 
compensation variable we also add a variable to proxy for the cost to the insider director 
for leaving his or her position. Our explicit assumption is that when the inside director 
leaves the board, he or she also leaves his or her position with the company. Unless the 
executive retires he or she will take, perhaps not immediately, a position with another 
company. Thus the cost to the executive is not what he or she was making prior to 
resigning, but the difference between that amount and his or her next position, i.e., his or 
her “opportunity cost.”
2 Model (2) is thus: 
Director Turnovert = α0 +  β1Director Remunerationt +  β1AExecutive Opportunity Costt + 
β2Existence of Director Pension Plant + β3Market Returnt + β3AInsider * 
Market Returnt + β4Market Returnt+1 + β4AInsider * Market Returnt+1 + 
β5Return on Assetst + β5AInsider * Return on Assetst + β6Return on Assetst+1 
+ β6AInsider * Return on Assetst+1 + β7Probability of Bankruptcyt + 
β8Litigation Prone Industryt  + β9High Positive Discretionary Accrualst + 
β10Meet or Beat Earnings Forecastst + β11High Positive Discretionary 
Accrualst * Meet or Beat Earnings Forecastst + β12Qualified Audit Opiniont + 
β13Audit Committee Chairt + β14Compensation Committee Chairt + β15Poor 
Director Attendancet + β16Director Aget + β17Director Gendert +  β18New 
CEOt + β19Director holds a full time position outside the firmt + β20Number 
of Other Directorshipst + β21High Tech Industryt + β22Big Five Auditort + 
β23Sizet + ε                        (2) 
 
  Where the dependent variable, director turnover, is discrete and takes the value of 
1 if year t is the director’s final year and zero otherwise, insider is an indicator variable 
that takes the value of 1 if the director is a full time employee of the firm and zero 
otherwise, and the subscript t represents year. The remaining independent variables, 
which are discussed below, and are more formally defined in table 1, can be classified 
into those that reflect compensation, firm performance, firm and director risk, and control 
variables. 
(insert table 1 about here) 
                                                 
2 We do not include a pension variable for inside directors as almost all executives have at least one, 
company provided pension plan.    9
 
Compensation 
  In model (1) we use the Director Remuneration and Existence of a Director 
Pension Plan to measure the remuneration the independent director receives from serving 
on the board. Director Remuneration incorporates the director retainer, our estimate of 
the meeting fees earned, as well our estimates of the value of the stock options and grants 
received. Unfortunately, our data set is not detailed enough to allow us to incorporate 
premiums for serving as committee chairs, or the actual meeting fees earned (as noted 
below we do have an indicator variable for director attendance). Consequently we do 
measure director compensation with noise. To control for the level of effort required, 
which varies across firms, we deflate this estimate by the number of board meetings held. 
We use an indicator variable for the Existence of a Director Pension Plan, as the only 
information we have is whether or not a pension plan exists, i.e., we have no information 
on the value of either the company contribution or the promised future payment. Our 
expectation, based upon hypothesis one, is that turnover will be negatively associated 
with each of these variables. In model (2) we add, as discussed above, Executive 
Opportunity Cost, in which we attempt to measure the amount of compensation the 
executive would give up by leaving the firm.  We measure this amount as the residual 
from the regression of executive total compensation on contemporaneous return on 
assets, market return, firm size, executive age and gender.
3 We also expect this 
coefficient to be negatively associated with turnover.  
Firm Performance 
  We use both accounting and market returns to measure firm performance, which 
we measure for both the year of, and the year after departure.  Under hypothesis two we 
                                                 
3 Models similar to this have been used in the literature; see for example, Balsam and Ryan (1996).   10
expect directors to be more likely to leave after a period of poor performance, while 
under hypothesis three we expect directors, who are in possession of inside information 
to be more likely to leave in advance of poor performance. Our expectation based upon 
these hypotheses is that each of these four variables will be negatively associated with 
turnover. 
Firm Risk 
  To measure firm risk we use five variables, one of which is a continuous measure 
of risk, Probability of Bankruptcy, and four are indicator variables, High Positive 
Discretionary Accruals, Meet or Beat Earnings Forecasts, Litigation Prone Industry, and  
Qualified Audit Opinion. We measure the Probability of Bankruptcy using the 
formulation in Zmijewski (1984) and discretionary accruals using the cross sectional 
version of the Jones (1991) model as in Defond and Jiambalvo (1994).  High Positive 
Discretionary Accruals is coded as one if discretionary accruals are in the top quartile and 
0 otherwise. Meet or Beat Earnings Forecast is defined as a dichotomous variable taking 
the value of one if the reported earnings per share meets or beats (by 1 cent) the mean 
analyst forecasts made during 30 days preceding the fiscal year end, as available on IBES 
database; and 0 otherwise. We define Litigation Prone Industries as an indicator variable 
taking the value of one if the firm is in SIC codes 2833 through 2836, 3570 through 3577, 
3600 through 3674, 5200 through 5961, or 7370 through 7374 as in Francis et al. (1994). 
Finally our indicator variable for Qualified Audit Opinion takes the value of one if the 
opinion is nonstandard. Our expectation based upon hypothesis four, is that independent 
director turnover will be positively associated with each of these variables.  
Director Risk 
  We measure the director specific risk, which is risk in addition to firm risk borne 
by all directors, using three indicator variables for whether the director chaired the Audit   11
or Compensation committee, and whether the director failed to attend at least 75 percent 
of board meetings, Poor Director Attendance.  Following hypothesis five we expect the 
coefficients on the Audit Committee Chair and Compensation Committee Chair 
indicators to be positive, while following hypothesis six, we expect the coefficient on the 
Poor Director Attendance indicator variable to be positive. Our reasoning is that both the 
Audit and Compensation committees are high profile and subject the individual, 
especially the chair, to additional risk as those members are likely to be singled out in the 
case of accounting frauds or if shareholders disagree with compensation decisions.
4 
Similarly, they are more subject to the claim of negligence if they fail to attend a 
sufficient number of meetings.
5  
Control Variables 
  We include director age, and indicator variables for gender, whether the firm has 
a new CEO, whether the director has a full time position outside the firm, the number of 
other directorships, an indicator variable for whether the firm is in a high technology 
industry, an indicator for whether the firm has a Big Five auditor, and firm size, as 
control variables as each may influence turnover.  While we partially control for director 
age below by excluding turnover caused by firm policies on age and tenure in position, 
we do not have data for all firms, nor do all firms have such policies. Consequently we 
expect turnover to be positively associated with director age in our sample. We include a 
gender indicator variable as there is research indicating that the appointment of women to 
the board is not random, e.g., they are more likely to be appointed to board of high 
performing firms (Farrell and Hersch 2005).  If that were the case, their pattern of 
                                                 
4 Please note that chairing these committees may also involve additional work on the part of the director.  
Consequently the director may resign/elect not to stand for reelection because of the work rather than the 
risk involved.  Empirically this explanation would lead to the same empirical prediction, i.e., positive 
coefficient. 
5 Alternatively, directors may fail to attend meeting for health reasons, which consequently make them 
more likely to leave the board.   12
turnover might also differ from that of their male counterparts. We include an indicator 
variable for the existence of a new CEO as a control variable for two reasons.  First in the 
governance literature, evidence suggests, for example, Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) 
and Shivdasani and Yermack (1999), that outside board members serve at the discretion 
of the CEO. So the new CEO may ask for or directors may offer to resign or not stand for 
reelection.  Second with respect to executives, Fee and Hadlock (2003) find that “the 
probability that a non CEO leaves office is elevated around CEO dismissals.” Consistent 
with this, Yermack (2004) finds that director turnover is greater if the appointing CEO is 
no longer in office. Thus, we expect a positive association between the new CEO 
indicator variable and director turnover.  
Both the indicator variable for whether the director has a full time position 
outside the firm and the number of other directorships proxy for the workload of the 
director which we expect will be positively associated with turnover.  An added reason 
that the existence of a full time position or the number of other directorships may be 
positively associated with turnover is that it proxies for the director’s other income, and 
we expect that as his or her other income is greater, the director will be more likely to 
walk away if the firm’s situation deteriorates. We define High Tech Industries as an 
indicator variable taking the value of one if the firm is in SIC codes 3570 through 3579, 
4800 through 4899, or 7370 through 7379, as in Balsam et al. (2003) and expect turnover 
to be greater for growth firms operating in dynamic industries (Henderson et. al. 2006). 
In contrast the existence of a Big Five Auditor, which is an indicator variable that takes 
the value of one if the audit firm is one of the big five
6 may reduce the director’s risk as 
their audit’s are expected to be of higher quality (see for example, Becker et al. 1998, 
Francis et al. 1999, Reynolds and Francis 2000) and they have deeper pockets in the 
                                                 
6 Our sample ends in 2002 before Andersen’s demise.   13
event of litigation. Finally we include size (logarithm of revenue) as a catch all variable 
measuring both the scale and complexity of the firm. 
V. Sample and Data 
One of the problems with either executive or director turnover is determining 
whether the departure is forced or voluntary. Corporations and the departing 
executive/director have incentive to make the departure appear amiable, even when it is 
not. Consequently press releases cannot always be relied on to make that distinction 
(Weisbach, 1988; Warner et al., 1988; Denis et al., 1997), rather algorithms have been 
developed (e.g., Huson et al. 2001) to distinguish voluntary from forced executive 
turnover. The Huson et al. algorithm, which is based upon keywords from the press 
release, the timing of release, and the age of the executive, does not transfer well to 
directors as directors departures are much lower key, i.e., most directors depart quietly at 
the end of their elected term.  Few directors resign during their term, and when they do, 
they are news.  An example is the following headline from the Wall Street Journal article 
(Mcbride 2006) “XM Satellite Director Resigns After Expressing Cost Concerns,” which 
discusses the abrupt resignation of director Pierce Roberts. Given the paucity of 
comparable disclosures, and the lack of a pre existing algorithm to separate involuntary 
from voluntary turnover, by necessity our turnover sample will include directors who 
voluntarily resigned or elected not to stand for reelection, and those who were forced 
from their position.
7 This of course, will add noise to our analysis, making it harder to 
find our hypothesized relationships. We were however, able to purchase a customized 
dataset from the Investor Resource Responsibility Center providing information on firms 
                                                 
7 For example, Tharp (2003) reports that Andrea Van de Kamp was forced from the Disney board for 
taking stands against then CEO Michael Eisner and Tejada (1997) reports that when Jesse L. Upchurch 
resigned as director of Tandy, he claimed he was being penalized for criticizing the CEO’s performance.   14
with mandatory retirement ages or maximum tenure policies, and we eliminate turnover 
due to these factors from our analysis.
8  
We obtain our data from a variety of sources including Execu Comp, CRSP, and 
IBES, as well as custom databases purchased from The Corporate Library and the 
Investor Responsibility Resource Center. Table 2 summarizes our sample selection 
procedure, while table 3 provides a distribution by director type, year and industry. As 
can be observed from table 2, we began with a total of 122,078 director year 
observations, which included inside, gray and independent directors. While we retain 
independent directors for our primary analysis (model 1) and inside directors for use in 
our secondary analysis (model 2), we eliminate gray directors as they may have other, 
“non director” factors which may determine their decision to continue on the board. We 
lose additional data as not all firms are on, or have sufficient ExecuComp, CRSP, or 
IBES data. We delete as involuntary, retirements due to the mandatory policies discussed 
above. Finally we delete observations where the director leaves more than one 
directorship in the same year, as it is likely those departures are driven by director 
specific, e.g., age or infirmity, rather than the firm specific factors examined here.  
(insert table 2 about here) 
Table 3 provides information on sample distribution by director type, year, 
turnover, and industry.  About 76 percent of our director year observations pertain to 
independent directors. In particular, the final sample contains 1,355 unique firms and 
11,837 unique directors, of which 8,275 are independent and 3,562 are insiders.  In terms 
of observations, 30,439 are for independent and 9,803 for inside directors. Panel B shows 
the sample appears to be fairly evenly spread across our five year sample period. 
                                                 
8 Unfortunately we do not have this data on all the firms in our sample.  For those firms we simply assume 
there is no mandatory retirement policy for directors.  Any noise as a result of this assumption will simply 
make it harder for us to find our hypothesized relationships.   15
Turnover for inside directors is higher than that for independent directors. Panel C shows 
there does appear to be some deviation between the sample and population (ExecuComp) 
proportions.  In particular service companies appear to be underrepresented when 
compared to the population. 
(insert table 3 about here) 
Table 4 provides some descriptive statistics about the variables used in our 
empirical model after winsorizing the variables at 1 and 99 percent. The mean for 
Director Turnover is 0.11, which indicates that the average director tenure is nine years. 
The average of director compensation, when viewed on a per meeting basis is not quite 
$12,000.
9  The percentage of observations with a pension plan is only nine percent, and 
dropping over time, as companies have been discontinuing their director pension plans in 
response to stakeholder pressure.  On average, both the market returns and accounting 
return on assets are positive, with market returns increasing from a mean of 10.47 percent 
in the year of turnover to 13.20 percent in the year after turnover and return on assets 
decreasing from 4.45 percent in the year of turnover to 4.18 percent in the year after.  
(insert table 4 about here) 
In terms of firm risk, we observe that the mean probability of bankruptcy is 6.19 
percent and mean high positive discretionary accruals are 0.25, by design. Over three 
percent of observations were either meeting or beating the earnings expectations by a 
cent, while 21 percent of firms are in litigation prone industries, and 25 percent receive a 
non standard opinion. Of our sample, six percent of directors chair the audit committee 
and seven percent chair the compensation committee, while the vast majority, 98 percent, 
attended at least 75 percent of board meetings. The average director age is just under 59, 
with only 10 percent of directors being female.  The fraction of firm year observations 
                                                 
9 The average number of meetings, not tabulated, is seven.   16
with a new CEO is 13 percent, seven percent are in high technology industries, and a 
preponderance of our sample firms, 87 percent, have a big five auditor. 
VI. Empirical Analysis 
  Our analyses are found in tables 5 through 8. First, we present results of the 
portfolio tests in table 5. In panel A, we partition the sample by director remuneration at 
the median value and existence of director pension plan, resulting in four portfolios. Tests 
of mean differences between columns and rows show that the independent director 
turnover increases as the director compensation declines. This supports hypothesis 1. In 
panel B (C), we partition past and future market returns (return on assets) at the median 
value, resulting in four portfolios. Consistent with hypotheses 2 and 3, tests of mean 
differences between columns and rows show that the independent director turnover 
increases as the past and future returns (return on assets) declines. Finally, panel D 
performs a joint portfolio test on past and future performances, using both returns and 
profitability. The results are consistent with panels B and C. We plot results of panels A 
and D in figures 1 and 2 to graphically depict the effects postulated in hypotheses 1 
through 3. 
(insert table 5, and figures 1 and 2 about here) 
Since our dependent variable is discrete, we begin with a logistic regression.  
However, to control for the econometric issues that may arise from the pooling of 
multiple executives from a single firm over a period of years we also use the new SAS 
procedure Glimmix.  Glimmix controls for both firm and time fixed and random effects 
in a logistic setting.  We begin with a discussion of model (1) which is in table 6. 
  With respect to hypothesis one, we find strong results in the anticipated direction.  
That is, we find both Director Remuneration and the Existence of a Director Pension plan   17
negatively associated with director turnover. These results, while differing in the level of 
significance, are consistent whether we use the logit or glimmix procedures.
10  
  We also find strong results for hypotheses two and three, as both accounting and 
stock returns in the year of, and year after, turnover are negatively associated with 
performance.
11 While the association between prior performance and turnover could be 
the result of either voluntary or involuntary turnover as directors are more likely to be 
asked to step down/aside when the firm is not performing well, the association between 
subsequent performance and turnover is most likely to be voluntary, and evidence 
consistent with directors having inside information and using that information to decide 
on whether to stay on the board.  
(insert table 6 about here) 
   Given the large number of variables used to measure firm risk, the likelihood of 
mixed results in testing hypothesis four was great and that is what we observe. That is, 
while the coefficient on probability of bankruptcy is positive and significant, as expected; 
the coefficient on litigation prone industry is insignificant. The coefficients on high 
positive discretionary accruals and meet or beat earnings forecasts are both 
insignificantly different from zero. However, the interaction between these two variables 
is positive and significant as expected. Finally, Qualified Audit Opinion is positive and 
significant.  
  To test hypothesis five we used indicator variables representing Audit and 
Compensation Committee chairs.  Contrary to our expectations, we find that turnover is 
                                                 
10 Since most of the results are consistent across the two procedures, from this point on, we will only 
mention if they differ. 
11 Both Yermack (2004) and Srinivasan (2005) used measures of performance and also found director 
turnover inversely related to firm performance.   18
significantly lower for directors that chaired these committees.
12 While serving on these 
committees does subject the director to more attention, perhaps it also brings them some 
level of prestige or additional compensation. For example GE reports in its 2002 proxy 
statement that Non employee directors are paid an annual Remuneration of $75,000 plus 
a fee of $2,000 for each Board meeting and for each Board Committee meeting attended 
(emphasis added).
13 Thus even though serving on chairing committees results in 
additional effort and exposure for directors, it also results in additional compensation.  
Additionally, the negative coefficients may be caused by selection bias in the types of 
directors who chair these committees, for example, those with sufficient free time or 
those close to the CEO. 
  Finally, we find that turnover is positively related to the Poor Director Attendance 
variable (hypothesis 6).  That is directors that fail to attend at least 75 percent of their 
companies’ board meetings are more likely to leave the board. These directors may be 
asked to leave the board, or may leave it voluntarily because they are too busy or ill to 
fulfill their commitment. 
  Turning to our control variables we find, as did both Yermack (2004) and 
Srinivasan (2005), that turnover increases with Director Age.  Yermack (2004) also finds 
turnover for female directors to be lower than that of their male counterparts. We find 
partial confirmation of the gender effect in the Glimmix version. Consistent with 
Srinivasan (2005) we find a positive and significant effect of a New CEO on director 
turnover. Counter to our expectations, independent director turnover is inversely related 
                                                 
12 While Yermack (2004) also found the coefficient on compensation committee membership to be 
negative, neither he, nor Srinivan (2005) found any relationship between audit committee membership and 
turnover. 
13 In recent years General Electric appears to have replaced its per meeting fees and increased the size of 
the director Remuneration, now $250,000.  It also pays directors an additional $25,000 if they sit on either 
the audit or compensation committee, or $50,000 if they sit on both.  Please see 2006 proxy statement. We 
refer to the 2002 proxy in the text as those were the conditions in effect during our sample period.   19
to the indicator variable for the director having a full time position and the continuous 
variable for number of other directorships. We also find turnover higher for firms in high 
technology industries and lower for firms with Big 5 auditors. Finally, we do not see an 
association between SIZE and director turnover.  
  The results for model (2) are presented in table 7. Consistent with our finding in 
table 6, in table 7 we find independent director turnover inversely associated with director 
remuneration and the existence of a director pension plan.  In addition, we find a negative 
and significant coefficient on the executive’s opportunity cost.  Consequently the results 
in table 7 also support hypothesis 1. Our primary concern though in table 7 is, do 
performance related incentives differentially affect turnover amongst independent and 
inside directors.  Consistent with the results in table 6, we find all four of the level 
performance measures, i.e., accounting and market returns for years t and t+1, to be 
negatively associated with turnover.  However for three of the interactions, those between 
market return for year t+1, accounting return for years t and t+1, and the indicator 
variable for inside director, we find a positive and significant incremental coefficient. 
More importantly, when we sum the coefficients for the level and interaction variables, 
we do not find inside director turnover affected by future or prior accounting or stock 
returns. Thus inside director turnover is less sensitive to performance than independent 
director turnover. One explanation is the bonding effect. For example, the employee will 
be unlikely to leave the firm during the unvested period of his pension benefits. Another 
explanation could be opportunity costs. For the insider, resigning from the board of 
directors would typically imply resigning from the firm as well. 
(insert table 7 about here) 
  Consistent with table 6, we find the level of bankruptcy risk positive and 
significantly associated with turnover, and those of being in litigation prone industry,   20
high positive discretionary accruals, and meeting or beating earnings expectations 
insignificantly associated with turnover.  However, the interaction of last two variables is 
significantly positive. The existence of a qualified audit opinion is now significant and 
positive for the logit but not for glimmix procedure. As with table 6, the coefficients on 
chairing the audit or compensation committee is negative and significant, while that 
representing poor director attendance is positive and significant.  For the most part, the 
coefficients on the control variables are consistent with those shown in table 6 with two 
exceptions. The coefficient on gender is now negative and significant for both 
regressions, indicating that turnover is lower for female directors; and coefficient on size 
is positive for both versions, suggesting a higher turnover for larger firms, possibly due to 
increased visibility effects.  
Sensitivity Analysis 
  Finally, one could argue that levels regressions (table 6) assume common 
thresholds for all directors to quit. Different directors may have different preferences and, 
hence, different tolerance limits. To accommodate this possibility, we run a change 
version of model 1. We estimate the change as (current value – value in the first year as 
director) deflated by value in first year as director. This relative change is then annualized 
by dividing by the number of years as director. The prefix ∆ denotes this conversion. 
Table 8 reports the results of the modified regressions. The results are qualitatively 
similar (with some exceptions discussed below) to those in table 6. Now coefficients of 
audit and compensation committee chairs are insignificant in glimmix; number of other 
directorships is insignificant in logistic; and size is significant and positive in both 
logistic and glimmix. 
(insert table 8 about here) 
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VII. Summary and Conclusions 
  In this paper we have provided evidence that independent director turnover is 
influenced by a series of economic factors.  In doing so, we confirm and extend the 
findings of Srinivasan (2005) and Yermack (2004). Our primary contributions are that by 
examining a broader sample over a more recent time period we show that not only do 
directors respond to the economic incentives provided by their compensation package, 
they also appear to utilize the inside information they possess about the future 
performance of the firm in deciding to continue as director. These are not factors 
considered by either Srinivasan or Yermack, and in theory at least, appear more likely to 
be drivers of voluntary, as opposed to involuntary turnover. Further, turnover of 
independent and inside directors (who were not considered by either Srinivasan or 
Yermack) appear to respond to different factors. 
  Directors, both independent and insider, appear to respond to the economic 
incentives provided by their compensation package, i.e., are less likely to leave if they are 
paid well or if the firm has a director pension plan. They are also more likely to leave 
when the firm is performing poorly or when they expect it to perform poorly, presumably 
because the firm’s poor performance may tarnish their reputation, but potentially because 
serving on the board of a poorly performing company requires a higher work load.
14 They 
are more likely to leave when the firm is riskier, but are less likely to leave when they 
chair certain committees such as the audit and compensation committee, which may bring 
them more prestige, or perhaps an additional stipend.  Differentially, the association 
between turnover and firm performance is weaker for inside directors.  This is consistent 
with independent directors responding primarily to reputation concerns, while inside 
directors responding primarily to their financial well being concerns.   
                                                 
14 While the sum of the coefficients for three of the four performance measures is insignificantly different 
from zero for inside directors, their turnover is inversely and significantly associated with market return in 
year t.    22
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TABLE 1 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
(in alphabetical order) 
Variable  Definition 
Director Turnover 
 
Dichotomous variable with value of 1 if this is the director’s last year on the 
job; and 0 otherwise 
∆ 
 
When pre fixed to a variable, implies annualized relative increase from the 
first year as director 




Executive Opportunity Cost 
 
Value of cash  retainer, plus per meeting fee times number of meeting, plus 
estimated value of stock and options granted to the director during the fiscal 
year (in $000) deflated by number of board meetings. 
Residual from regression of log of total direct compensation on contemporary 
return on assets, market return, log of revenues, director age and gender. 
Existence of  Director 
Pension Plan 
Dichotomous variable with value of 1 if the firm has a director’s pension plan; 
and 0 otherwise 
Performance Variables   
Return on Assets  Return on assets  
Market Return  With dividends market return 
Measures of Firm Risk   
Probability of Bankruptcy  Zmijewski’s measure of financial distress 
High Positive Discretionary 
Accruals 
 
Dichotomous variable taking the value of one if the discretionary accruals 
from Jone’s cross sectional model deflated by total assets at the beginning of 
the fiscal year is in the upper quartile; 0 otherwise 




Dichotomous variable taking the value of one if the reported earnings per 
share meets or beats (by 1 cent) the mean analyst forecasts made during 30 
days preceding the fiscal year end, as available on IBES database; and 0 
otherwise 
Litigation Prone Industry 
 
 
Dichotomous variable taking the value of one if the firm is in SIC codes 2833 
through 2836, 3570 through 3577, 3600 through 3674, 5200 through 5961, or 
7370 through 7374 
Qualified Audit Opinion 
 
Dichotomous variable with value of 1 if the firm received a qualified opinion; 
and 0 otherwise 
Measures of Director Risk   
Audit Committee Chair 
 
Dichotomous variable with value of 1 if the director chairs the audit 
committee; and 0 otherwise 
Compensation Committee 
Chair 
Dichotomous variable with value of 1 if the director chairs the compensation 
committee; and 0 otherwise 
Poor Director Attendance 
 
Dichotomous variable with value of 1 if the director failed to attend at least 
75% of the board/committee meetings; 0 otherwise 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
 
Control Variables 
Director Age  Director’s age 
Gender 
 
Dichotomous variable with value of 1 if the Director is a female; and 0 
otherwise 
New CEO  Dichotomous variable with value of 1 if a new CEO took over in the current 
year; and 0 otherwise 
Director holds a full time 
position outside the firm 
Dichotomous variable with value of 1 if director holds a full time position 
outside the firm; and 0 otherwise  
Number of other 
Directorships 
Number of other company boards as director 
 
High Tech Industry 
 
Dichotomous variable taking the value of one if the firm is in SIC codes 3570 
through 3579, 4800 through 4899, or 7370 through 7379 
Big Five Auditor 
 
Dichotomous variable with value of 1 if the firm is audited by a big 5 audit 
firm; and 0 otherwise 
Size  Logarithm of revenue 
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TABLE 2 
SAMPLE SELECTION 
   





Data available on 2004 Director database   122,078 
  Less gray directors  (30,634) 
  Less data not available on Execu Comp 2004, CRSP 
2004, and IBES 2004 
 (50,429) 
  Less involuntary departures  (401)
 
  Less multiple resignations  (372) 





Panel A: Distribution by Director Type 
 
Type  Observations  Directors 
Independent  30,439  8,275 
Insider  9,803  3,562 
 Total  40,242  11,837 
 










Independent  Insider 
Obs.  Turnover  Obs.  Turnover 
1998  7,011  5,168  475 (9.19%)  1,843  250 (13.56%) 
1999  7,643  5,707  500 (8.76%)  1,936  275 (14.20%) 
2000  8,246  6,227  605 (9.72%)  2,019  311 (15.40%) 
2001  8,676  6,674  821 (12.30%)  2,002  363 (18.13%) 
2002  8,666  6,663  690 (10.36%)  2,003  289 (14.43%) 
 Total  40,242  30,439  3,091 (10.16%)  9,803  1,488 (15.18%) 
 
Panel C: Distribution across Industries 
 
Industry  Sample Obs.  Sample %  Population % 
1.  Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing  52  0.13  0.24 
2.   Mining  1,474  3.66  3.60 
3.   Construction  581  1.44  0.96 
4.   Manufacturing  17,275  42.93  42.78 
5.   Transportation and Utilities  5,308  13.19  11.41 
6.    Wholesale  1,329  3.30  3.00 
7.    Retail  3,294  8.19  7.66 
8.    Financial Services  6,875  17.08  14.14 
9.    Services  3,813  9.48  15.83 
10.   Other  241  0.60  0.37 
 Total  40,242  100.00  100 
 
The industry classification is based on Dopuch et al. (1987), and includes the following 
SIC codes: 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing ~100 999; Mining ~ 1000 1499; Construction ~ 1500 
1999; Manufacturing ~ 2000 3999; Transportation and Utilities ~ 4000 4999; Wholesale 
~ 5000 5199; Retail ~ 5200 5999; Financial Services ~ 6000 6999; Services ~ 7000 
8999; Others ~ < 100 and > 8999   28
TABLE 4 
VARIABLE DISTRIBUTION 
(n = 40,242) 
 
Variable  Mean  Median  Std. Dev. 
Director Turnovert  0.1138  0  0.3176 
Compensation Variables       
Director Remunerationt  11.9408  8.0278  16.2046 
Executive Opportunity Costt  0  2.1012  3.1279 
Existence of Director Pension Plant  0.0878  0  0.283 
Performance Variables       
Market Returnt  0.1047  0.0800  0.38 
Market Returnt+1  0.1320  0.1204  0.3759 
Return on Assetst  0.0445  0.0386  0.0573 
Return on Assetst+1  0.0418  0.0363  0.0565 
Measures of Firm Risk       
Probability of Bankruptcyt  0.0619  0.0089  0.1194 
High Positive Discretionary Accrualst  0.2500  0  0.4352 
Meet or Beat Earnings Forecastt  0.0303  0  0.1355 
 Litigation Prone Industryt  0.2127  0  0.4092 
Qualified Audit Opiniont  0.2470  0  0.4313 
Measures of Director Risk       
Audit Committee Chairt  0.0633  0  0.2435 
Compensation Committee Chairt  0.0666  0  0.2494 
Poor Director Attendancet  0.0225  0  0.1483 
Control Variablest       
Director Aget  58.8372  59.0000  8.538 
Gendert  0.1024  0  0.3032 
New CEOt  0.1252  0  0.3309 
Director holds a full time position 
outside the firm t 
0.8572  1  0.3499 
Number of other Directorships t  0.9424  0  1.3282 
High Tech Industryt  0.0770  0  0.2665 
Big Five Auditort  0.8738  1  0.3321 
Sizet  7.5453  7.4266  1.4766 
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TABLE 5 
PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR TURNOVER  
(Test variable = Director Turnover) 
[n = 30,439] 
 
 
Panel A: Test on Director Compensation 
 
Portfolio  Director Remunerationt  
< median 
Director Remunerationt  
≥ median 
t Statistic 
No Pension Plan   0.1086  0.0969  ***3.2025 
Pension Plan Exists  0.0952  0.0837  *1.3613 
t Statistic  **1.6994  *1.5939  ***2.9885 
 
 
Panel B: Test on Returns 
 
Portfolio  Market Returnt+1  
< median 
Market Returnt+1  
≥ median 
t Statistic 
Market Returnt < Median  0.1204  0.1108  **1.8369 
Market Returnt ≥ Median  0.1093  0.0943  ***2.9827 
t Statistic  **2.1282  ***3.2739  ***4.7339 
 
 
Panel C: Test on Profitability 
 
Portfolio  Return on Assetst+1 
< median 
Return on Assetst+1 
≥ median 
t Statistic 
Return on Assetst < median  0.1325  0.1103  ***3.4397 
Return on Assetst ≥ median  0.1004  0.0924  *1.3240 
t Statistic  ***5.1385  ***2.8612  ***9.9923 
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TABLE 5 (continued) 
 
Panel D: Joint Test on Returns and Profitability 
 
    Future Performance  t test 


















Poor  0.1286  0.1157  0.0963  ***2.7835 
Medium  0.1125  0.1064  0.0887  ***3.5572 
Good  0.1075  0.0809  0.0774  ***2.6041 
t test  
(Poor v/s Good)  **1.7331  ***5.4985  **1.7251  ***6.7557 
 
See table 1 for variable definitions.  
 
Future performance is poor if Market Returnt+1 and Return on Assetst+1 are both less than 
the corresponding medians; Future performance is good if MarketReturnt+1 and Return on 
Assetst+1 are both greater than or equal to the corresponding medians; and performance is 
medium otherwise. Past performance is similarly defined. 
 
All significance levels are one sided. 
*  significant at 10% level 
**  significant at 5% level 
***  significant at 1% level 
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TABLE 6 







Logit  Glimmix 
Intercept    *** 3.9417  *** 3.9688 
Director Compensation       
Director Remunerationt  –  ** 0.0023  ** 0.0031 
Existence of Director Pension Plant  –  *** 0.1982  *** 0.7484 
Performance Variables       
Market Returnt  –  ** 0.1041  ** 0.1027 
Market Returnt+1  –  ** 0.0883  * 0.0414 
Return on Assetst  –  *** 0.0249  *** 0.0222 
Return on Assetst+1  –  ** 0.0081  ** 0.0091 
Measures of Firm Risk       
Probability of Bankruptcyt  +  ***0.7125  ***0.7361 
Litigation Prone Industryt  +   0.0005   0.0041 
High Positive Discretionary Accrualst  +  0.0116  0.0192 
Meet or Beat Earnings Forecastt  +   0.0564   0.0575 
Meet or Beat Earnings Forecastt * 
High Positive Discretionary Accrualst 
 
+  **1.0350  **1.0898 
Qualified Audit Opiniont  +  **0.1149  *0.0720 
Measures of Director Risk       
Audit Committee Chairt  +  *** 0.1787  *** 0.1938 
Compensation Committee Chairt  +  *** 0.1693  *** 0.2124 
Poor Director Attendancet  +  ***0.7500  ***0.1306 
Control Variables       
Director Aget  +  ***0.0382  ***0.0384 
Gendert  ?   0.0808  * 0.0859 
New CEOt  +  ***0.1927  ***0.1901 
Director holds a full time position 
outside the firm t 
 
+  *** 0.2260  ** 0.1644 
Number of other Directorships t  +  *** 0.1342  *** 0.2235 
High Tech Industryt  +  ***0.3705  ***0.3755 
Big Five Auditort  –  *** 0.1833  *** 0.1750 
Sizet  ?   0.0035   0.0040 
Observations    30,439  30,439 
Wald Chi sqr
    676   
Pearson Chi sqr      30,906 
Prob > Chi sqr    0.0001  0.0001 
 
See table 1 for variable definitions.        
*  significant at 10% level 
**  significant at 5% level  
***  significant at 1% level  
Significance levels are one sided for variables with directional expectations; two sided 
otherwise. 
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 TABLE 7 







Logit  Glimmix 
Intercept  ?  *** 3.8522  *** 3.897 
Director Compensation       
Director Remunerationt  –  *** 0.0037  *** 0.0044 
Executive Opportunity Costt  –  *** 0.0556  *** 0.0557 
Existence of Director Pension Plant  –  *** 0.1717  *** 0.1425 
Performance Variables       
Market Returnt  –  *** 0.1332  *** 0.1399 
Insider*Market Returnt  ?   0.0763   0.0763 
Market Returnt+1  –  ** 0.1641  *** 0.1136 
Insider*Market Returnt+1  ?  **0.2176  **0.2138 
Return on Assetst  –  *** 0.0304  *** 0.0281 
Insider*Return on Assetst  ?  ***0.0312  ***0.0309 
Return on Assetst+1  –  *** 0.0139  *** 0.0143 
Insider*Return on Assetst+1  ?  ***0.0226  ***0.0228 
Measures of Firm Risk       
Probability of Bankruptcyt  +  ***0.7229  ***0.7372 
Litigation Prone Industryt  +  0.0179  0.0151 
High Positive Discretionary Accrualst  +  0.0009  0.0096 
Meet or Beat Earnings Forecastt  +  0.0446  0.0476 
Meet or Beat Earnings Forecastt * 
High Positive Discretionary Accrualst 
 
+  ***1.0333  ***1.0788 
Qualified Audit Opiniont  +  *0.0491  0.0244 
Measures of Director Risk       
Audit Committee Chairt  +  *** 0.2838  *** 0.3186 
Compensation Committee Chairt  +  *** 0.2815  *** 0.3087 
Poor Director Attendancet  -  ***0.6601  ***0.6560 
Control Variables       
Director Aget  +  ***0.0351  ***0.0355 
Gendert  ?  *** 0.1799  *** 0.1872 
New CEOt  +  ***0.3331  ***0.3286 
Director holds a full time position 
outside the firm t 
 
+  *** 0.1132  ** 0.0986 
Number of other Directorshipst  +  *** 0.1458  *** 0.1424 
High Tech Industryt  +  ***0.3347  ***0.3399 
Big Five Auditort  –  *** 0.1394  *** 0.1321 
Sizet  ?  *0.0168  *0.0162 
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  Regression Type 




Pearson Chi sqr 
Prob > Chi sqr
 









See table 1 for variable definitions.        
*  significant at 10% level 
**  significant at 5% level  
***  significant at 1% level  
Significance levels are one sided for variables with directional expectations; two sided 
otherwise.    34
TABLE 8 







Logit  Glimmix 
Intercept    *** 8.439  *** 9.2400 
Director Compensation       
∆Director Remunerationt  –  * 0.0110  * 0.0048 
∆Existence of Director Pension Plant  –  ** 0.2878  ** 0.2315 
Performance Variables       
∆Market Returnt  –  *** 0.1886  *** 0.1574 
∆Market Returnt+1  –  *** 0.1935  *** 0.1617 
∆Return on Assetst  –  ** 0.1301  ** 0.1000 
∆Return on Assetst+1  –  *** 0.1427  *** 0.1175 
Measures of Firm Risk       
∆Probability of Bankruptcyt  +  ***0.0379  ***0.0371 
Litigation Prone Industryt  +   0.2425   0.2769 
∆High Positive Discretionary Accrualst  +   0.0211   0.0259 
∆Meet or Beat Earnings Forecastt  +   0.2893   0.2341 
∆Meet or Beat Earnings Forecastt *  
∆High Positive Discretionary Accrualst 
 
+  **1.3529  **1.3196 
∆Qualified Audit Opiniont  +  ***0.3112  *0.0598 
Measures of Director Risk       
∆Audit Committee Chairt  +  * 0.1508  0.0023 
∆Compensation Committee Chairt  +  * 0.1575   0.0038 
∆Poor Director Attendancet  +  ***0.0999  ***0.0747 
Control Variables       
Director Aget  +  ***0.0859  ***0.0840 
Gendert  ?  *** 0.2997  *** 0.2675 
New CEOt  +  *0.1156  **0.1344 
∆Director holds a full time position 
outside the firm t 
 
+  *** 0.4021  ** 0.2170 
∆ Number of other Directorships t  +   0.0342  * 0.0980 
High Tech Industryt  +  **0.268  **0.2866 
Big Five Auditort  –  * 0.1669   0.0927 
∆Sizet  ?  ***17.5719  ***11.5942 
Observations    23,421  23,421 
Wald Chi sqr
    764   
Pearson Chi sqr      20,370 
Prob > Chi sqr    0.0001  0.0001 
 
See table 1 for variable definitions.        
*  significant at 10% level 
**  significant at 5% level  
***  significant at 1% level  
Significance levels are one sided for variables with directional expectations; two sided 
otherwise.   35
FIGURE 1 








































See table 1 for variable definitions and panel A of table 5 for tests of significance. 
 
Director Remuneration is low if below the median and high otherwise. 
   36
FIGURE 2 













































See table 1 for variable definitions and panel D of table 5 for tests of significance.  
 
Future performance is poor if Market Returnt+1 and Return on Assetst+1 are both less than 
the corresponding medians; Future performance is good if MarketReturnt+1 and Return on 
Assetst+1 are both greater than or equal to the corresponding medians; and performance is 
medium otherwise. Past performance is similarly defined. 
 
 